Mental imagery in the motor context

Abstract

The working hypothesis of the paper is that motor images are endowed with the same properties as those of the (corresponding) motor representations, and therefore have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented movement and the same causal role in the generation of this movement. The fact that the timing of simulated movements follows the same constraints as that of actually executed movements is consistent with this hypothesis. Accordingly, many neural mechanisms are activated during motor imagery, as revealed by a sharp increase in tendinous reflexes in the limb imagined to move, and by vegetative changes which correlate with the level of mental effort. At the cortical level, a specific pattern of activation, that closely resembles that of action execution, is observed in areas devoted to motor control. This activation might be the substrate for the effects of mental training. A hierarchical model of the organization of action is proposed: this model implies a short-term memory storage of a 'copy' of the various representational steps. These memories are erased when an action corresponding to the represented goal takes place. By contrast, if the action is incompletely or not executed, the whole system remains activated, and the content of the representation is rehearsed. This mechanism would be the substrate for conscious access to this content during motor imagery and mental training.