The development of conditional reasoning and the structure of semantic memory

Abstract

The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from a revised version of Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first study examined the prediction that younger children (8 years of age) would have greater difficulty in responding correctly to premises where the antecedent was strongly associated with the consequent than to premises where the association was weaker; for example, "If something is a car, then it has a motor" should be more difficult than "If something is a refrigerator, then it has a motor." A total of 55 children in grades 2 and 3 (average age: 8 years) and 49 children in grades 5 and 6 (average age: 11 years) were given either 2 strongly associated problems or weakly associated counterparts. Results indicated that 8-year-olds did better on the weakly associated problems than on the strongly associated problems, but there was no difference among the 11-year-olds. The second study examined the prediction that younger children (8 years of age) would have greater difficulty in responding correctly to causal premises ("If a rock is thrown at a window, the window will break") than to corresponding ad hoc premises ("A rock is something that can be used to break a window"). A total of 53 children in grades 2 and 3 (average age: 8 years) and 49 children in grades 5 and 6 (average age: 11 years) were given either 2 causal problems or ad hoc counterparts. Results indicated that 8-year-old did better on the ad hoc problems than on the causal problems, but there was no difference among the 11-year-olds. These studies are interpreted as consistent with the idea that 1 major factor in the development of reasoning in this age level is the development of children's ability to explore their own knowledge base.